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Abstract 
Plurilateral agreements in the WTO context allow sub-sets of countries to agree to commitments in 
specific policy areas that only apply to signatories, and thus allow for ‘variable geometry’ in the WTO. 
Plurilateral agreements share a number of features with preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that are 
increasingly used by governments to liberalize trade in goods and services. This paper discusses the 
current institutional framework that governs these two alternatives, and that distinguishes them from 
the general, nondiscriminatory agreements that are negotiated among—and apply to—all WTO 
Members. Current WTO rules make it much more difficult to pursue the plurilateral route than to 
negotiate a PTA. We review the arguments for and against making it easier for “issue-specific” clubs 
to form in the WTO, and discuss how concerns raised by some WTO Members regarding the potential 
negative impact of plurilateral agreements on the multilateral trading system might be addressed. We 
take the view that action to facilitate the negotiation of plurilateral agreements in the WTO should be 
considered and that the potential downsides for the multilateral trading system can be managed. 
Keywords 
WTO, plurilateral, trade agreements, Doha Round, clubs 
JEL Classification: F13, K32 
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1. Introduction* 
The Doha Round deadlock illustrates how difficult rule-making is in the WTO. At the same time, the 
proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) illustrates that there is a continuing appetite 
among WTO Members to use trade agreements to liberalize international commerce “if the price is 
right.” Recent examples that involve major trading nations include the agreements signed by Korea 
with the EU and the US, the ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, and the launch 
talks on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement between the US and the 
EU. The many PTAs in force today indicate that the problems in the WTO are not a reflection of an 
unwillingness of governments to make binding trade policy-related commitments embedded in treaty 
instruments, but prima facie, an unwillingness to make similar commitments on a WTO-wide basis.  
It may be that one of the consequences of the Doha deadlock has been to give countries greater 
incentives to engage in PTAs. But there may be a reverse causality effect as well: the existence of the 
PTA option may reduce the incentive to agree on rules on a multilateral basis. What is clear is that 
PTAs are resulting in increasing fragmentation of the rules of the game for businesses engaged in 
international trade.  
The WTO offers two mechanisms for Members to form ‘clubs’ that allow them to move forward on 
an agenda of common interest: negotiating a PTA that is justified under Art. XXIV GATT and/or Art. 
V GATS, or conclusion of a Plurilateral Agreement (PA) under Art. II.3 of the Agreement 
Establishing the WTO (hereafter ‘the WTO Agreement’). This provision permits sub-sets of the WTO 
Membership to agree to certain disciplines applying to signatories only. In contrast to a PTA, which 
must cover substantially all trade in goods (Art, XXIV GATT), and/or have substantial sectoral 
coverage of services (Art. V GATS), PAs can be issue-specific. PAs were quite prevalent under the 
pre-WTO GATT regime: in the Kennedy- (1964-67) and Tokyo (1973-79) Rounds, a number of PAs 
(at the time called ‘codes of conduct’, or simply ‘codes’) were negotiated and bound only their 
signatories (Stern and Hoekman, 1987). Examples include agreements on antidumping, technical 
barriers to trade (product standards), subsidies and countervailing measures, import licensing and 
customs valuation (see Annex 1). Most of these agreements only attracted limited membership.  
During the Uruguay Round, as part of the move to create the WTO, virtually all of the GATT codes 
of conduct were transformed into multilateral agreements that apply to all WTO Members. This 
followed from the decision to opt for a ‘single undertaking’ whereby all WTO Members would 
observe the same legal commitments. As a result, much of the ‘GATT à la carte’ approach to 
rulemaking was superseded. At present there is only one significant PA in the WTO, the Agreement 
on Government Procurement (GPA).
1
  
Greater use of PAs was suggested by several WTO Members in the aftermath of the collapse of the 
Cancún ministerial meeting in 2003, as well as by analysts (e.g., Lawrence, 2006; Levy, 2006). More 
recently an increasing number of proponents argue for greater use of PAs as a way of allowing sub-
sets of countries to move forward on an issue (e.g., Harbinson 2009; Gallager and Stoler 2009; Elsig 
                                                     
*
 We are particularly grateful to our discussant, Phil Levy, as well as to Richard Baldwin, Paola Conconi, David Laborde, 
Aaditya Mattoo, Michele Ruta, Alvaro Santos, Robert Wolfe and to participants in the conference ‘The Multilateral 
Trading System in the 21st Century’, Institute for International Economic Policy, George Washington University, April 
18-19 2013 and the Institute of International Economic Law seminar, Georgetown University for comments and 
suggestions, and to Jagdish Bhagwati, André Sapir, and Stephen Woolcock for helpful discussions. 
1
 There were initially four PAs: the GPA, agreements on dairy products and on beef and the Agreement on Civil Aircraft. 
The beef and dairy agreements were terminated in 1997.  
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2010; Bacchus 2012; Rodriguez-Mendoza, 2012; Hufbauer and Schott, 2012).
2
 An example is the 
suggestion by Australia to negotiate a plurilateral International Services Agreement (ISA), supported 
by the US and other “real good friends of services.”3 PAs are frequently argued to provide an avenue 
that allows progress to be made on rule-making under the umbrella of the WTO.  
There is, however, significant opposition to expanding the number of PAs in the WTO. Brazil and 
India among others have opposed the idea of adopting an agreement on trade facilitation or on services 
on a plurilateral basis. Interestingly, there appears to be much less concern as regards PTAs, which 
have become a major vehicle for WTO Members to pursue trade and investment liberalization. All 
WTO Members are parties to at least one PTA, and some are parties to dozens.
4
 Indeed, the WTO 
website reports that over 500 PTAs have been notified to the WTO, with some 400 remaining in force.  
What PTAs and PAs have in common is that both permit discrimination
5
 and both involve binding 
commitments: they liberalize trade or define rules of the game only for a sub-set of the WTO 
Membership that shares similar views.
6
 PTAs in practice often go beyond the current WTO mandate.
7
 
In principle, PAs that cover areas not falling under the current WTO mandate could be used as 
substitute for PTAs.
8
 This is most clearly the case for potential services agreements—an ISA could be 
designed to be a PTA under GATS Art. V or be put forward as a PA. The difference is that whereas 
PAs can be limited to just one policy area, PTAs must have substantial coverage of the trade between 
the partners. This helps explain why the largest traders have yet to agree to PTAs between themselves 
– they do not want to give preferential access to just one major trading partner. Large countries may 
have greater incentives to pursue PAs insofar as they are not able to agree to binding disciplines in a 
given policy domain through a PTA. The other difference is that PAs that have been approved by the 
WTO Membership cannot be legally challenged before a WTO Panel for being inconsistent with the 
multilateral rules. It is not possible to challenge the consistency of an act by WTO organs with the 
WTO contract: Art. 1 DSU defines disputes as concerns raised between and across WTO Members. 
With the advent of the Transparency Mechanism in 2006, there is no longer any effort by WTO 
Members to approve new PTAs. As a result, their consistency with the WTO can always be raised 
before a Panel. Hence, whereas there is threat of a legal challenge against PTAs that are duly notified 
to the WTO and discussed in the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA), the competent 
WTO organ to review PTAs, no similar threat exists vis-à-vis PAs that have been approved by the 
WTO Membership.  
In this paper we assess the arguments for and against a more concerted effort to use (and accept the 
use of) PAs. The extant literature on PAs largely ignores the PTA dimension and centers on PAs vs. 
the Single Undertaking/MFN agreements, including so-called critical mass agreements, under which 
commitments are negotiated among a set of countries that have the greatest stake/interest in an issue, 
with the benefits of whatever is agreed extended to all WTO Members, whether they join or not. The 
                                                     
2
 As discussed below many of these authors use the term plurilateral to describe critical mass approaches, which do not 
regard as plurilateral agreements under the WTO.  
3
 This terminology is commonly used to describe the countries that have launched discussions on an ISA.  
4
 The last hold-out, Mongolia, launched FTA negotiations with Japan in 2012. 
5
 In practice, with a few exceptions, the various Tokyo Round codes of conduct were applied on an MFN basis by 
signatories. As discussed below, a difference between GATT-era PAs and the PAs that may be sought by groups of WTO 
members today is that today’s PAs might not be applied on a MFN basis. 
6
 Canada had already advanced arguments in the 1940s, to the effect that negotiating the original GATT would have been 
greatly facilitated if only like-minded were included in the negotiation. See Irwin et al. (2008).  
7
 Horn et al. (2010) distinguish between WTO+ and WTO-X obligations in PTAs: the former cover matters that are fall 
under the current mandate of the WTO but where commitments in the PTA-context are more comprehensive (e.g., deeper 
than MFN tariff cuts); the latter refer to policy areas currently not addressed by the WTO (e.g., cooperation on macro-
economic policies). 
8
 We elaborate on this point below.  
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latter are often called “plurilateral agreements” but we shall reserve this term for WTO Annex 4 
agreements, which need not be critical mass agreements and may be applied on a discriminatory basis 
to signatories only.
9
 We compare the statutory provisions regarding the quintessential elements of 
PTAs and PAs viewed from the perspective of a multilateralist: the manner in which the multilateral 
regime prejudges (if at all) their substantive content; the conditions for membership and accession by 
new members; and institutional aspects such as transparency and dispute settlement procedures. In our 
view, content, accession, transparency and dispute settlement are key features that determine the 
relationship between the multilateral regime based on nondiscrimination on the one hand, and these 
two discriminatory regimes on the other.  
In Section 2, we describe the current legal statutes regulating the establishment of PTAs and PAs. 
We distinguish between statutory provisions and their enforcement because the multilateral provisions 
on PTAs are almost never enforced, while the jury is out on this score with respect to PAs. With this 
background, in Section 3 we discuss the incentives that are established by the WTO provisions for the 
countries joining PAs or PTAs, as well as for non-members. Section 4 turns to a discussion of possible 
policy reforms that would reduce the downsides of PAs from a multilateralist perspective while at the 
same time lowering the hurdles that must be overcome by countries seeking to introduce new PAs into 
the WTO. In our view the status quo has created a gap—because it is too difficult to obtain approval 
for PAs, governments confront additional incentives to negotiate and expand the coverage of PTAs or 
are forced to limit cooperation in the areas concerned to ‘soft law’ forms of interaction.10 The result is 
an ever increasing splintering of the trading system that is less transparent than one that would allow 
greater scope for countries to conclude PAs. Section 5 concludes.  
2. The Current Legal Context 
As mentioned above, the Uruguay Round was premised on the so-called single undertaking-approach: 
membership of the WTO was made contingent upon accepting all of the treaties as a package. This 
approach is in sharp contrast to the GATT à la carte-approach followed during the Tokyo Round 
(1973–1979). The WTO was designed to offer a ‘menu du jour’: customers (WTO Members) cannot 
choose particular items but must accept the whole offering. The shift away from à la carte was 
deliberate and an explicit objective of many negotiators, who sought to extend the disciplines 
negotiated in earlier Rounds to all members of the WTO. Their argument was that the Codes created 
unnecessary confusion as to who had signed what and was bound by which obligations, and more 
important, that it was necessary to address free-riding by non-signatories to the Codes (given that most 
Codes were applied on a MFN basis).  
Despite the strong push towards multilateralization of the Codes, four Tokyo Round codes were 
excluded from the Single Undertaking: the Agreement on Civil Aircraft, the International Dairy 
                                                     
9
 Accommodating diversity in interests through greater use of critical mass agreements that apply on a MFN basis was one 
of the recommendations of the Warwick Commission (2007). The critical mass approach has been described as “a 
practice where countries refrain from blocking consensus when a critical mass of countries supports a proposed change. 
This critical mass of countries could be expressed as an overwhelming majority of countries and an overwhelming 
amount of the trade weight in the world, such as 90 percent of both of these factors” (Jackson, 2001: 74-75). Critical 
mass was always a major feature of GATT negotiations and continues to be under the WTO as a result of the MFN rule: 
countries that make/seek concessions in an area have an interest in minimizing free riding and will therefore seek to 
ensure that all the major players are part of a deal. An example of a critical mass agreement that was negotiated after the 
Uruguay Round was concluded is the International Technology Agreement (ITA). Other critical mass agreements include 
the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications and the Agreement on Financial Services, both concluded in the years 
immediately following the Uruguay Round. There have also been numerous sector-specific “zero-for-zero” tariff 
agreements that were conditioned on the existence of a critical mass of participants (Hufbauer and Schott, 2012). See 
Hoekman and Kostecki (2009) and Elsig (2010) for further discussion.  
10
 Of course, for some subjects non-binding forms of cooperation may be preferable; the implicit presumption here is that 
there are negative pecuniary spillovers that an enforceable agreement allows countries to internalize. 
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Agreement, the International Bovine Meat Agreement and the Agreement on Government 
Procurement (GPA). These became so-called Annex 4 agreements (i.e., PAs) that only bind those 
WTO Members that opted to sign them.
11
 The first three of these agreements were excluded from the 
single undertaking for pragmatic reasons: they were sector specific agreements and of concern to only 
a small number of WTO Members. The signatories saw the benefits of their continued existence while 
others did not have an interest in the products concerned. The GPA did not become a multilateral 
agreement because procurement was excluded from the coverage of the GATT—all the other Tokyo 
Round Codes addressed matters that were covered by GATT provisions.  
Art. II.3 of the WTO Agreement defines the legal status of these PAs as follows:  
The agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4 (hereinafter referred to as 
"Plurilateral Trade Agreements") are also part of this Agreement for those Members that have 
accepted them, and are binding on those Members. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not 
create either obligations or rights for Members that have not accepted them.  
Art. X.9 of the WTO Agreement states that the Ministerial Conference of the WTO may decide to 
add an agreement to the existing set of PAs listed in Annex 4 “exclusively by consensus.” Existing 
agreements may be terminated if signatory WTO Members deem this appropriate, provided that they 
respect the statutory conditions to this effect. Termination did occur with respect to the dairy and 
bovine meat agreements: both were terminated by decisions of the General Council on 31 December 
1997 and 17 December 1997 respectively. While the Agreement on Civil Aircraft is still in force, 
many of its disciplines on subsidies have been superseded by the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures and the GPA (which includes rules on public purchases of civil aircraft).
12
  
There are four dimensions of PTAs and PAs that are particularly relevant in assessing the impact of 
such agreements on the trading system: the coverage of an agreement; whether and under what 
conditions new countries can join; reporting and related transparency mechanisms; and dispute 
settlement procedures. What follows discusses the applicable rules under the WTO that have a bearing 
on these dimensions. 
2.1 Rules on the Content of an Agreement 
PTAs: Article XXIV GATT allows for free trade areas (FTAs) and customs unions if:  
(a) trade barriers after formation of the PTA do not rise on average (Article XXIV:5);  
(b) all tariffs and other regulations of commerce are removed on substantially all trade within a 
reasonable length of time (Article XXIV:8); and  
(c) they have been notified to the WTO Council.13  
                                                     
11
 Sometimes the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) is inaccurately depicted as a PA. It is not. It is a critical mass 
agreement that is implemented on a MFN basis through tariff commitments (bindings) of signatories. 
12
 Much of this agreement was superseded with the adoption of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
as the genesis of the PA was an effort by the EU and the US to agree on more specific rules of the game in this area than 
prevailed in the pre-WTO years. The primary added value of the Civil Aircraft Agreement is the commitment by the 31 
signatories to eliminate import duties on a specific list of products, including all non-military aircraft, civil aircraft 
engines, parts and components, all components and sub-assemblies of civil aircraft, and flight simulators and their parts 
and components. This applies on a MFN basis because the products involved are subject to the GATT. In regard of its 
market access dimension this PA is an example of a critical mass agreement. 
13
 Developing countries are not bound by Art. XXIV as a result of the 1979 Decision on Differential and More Favorable 
Treatment of Developing Countries (the so-called Enabling Clause). This essentially removes the ‘substantially all trade’ 
test and allows for preferences between developing country PTA members (that is, the full removal of internal barriers – 
free trade – is not required). 
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The ‘substantially all trade’ condition is somewhat counter-intuitive in that maximum preferential 
liberalization is likely to be more detrimental to non-members than partial liberalization. A rationale 
for the rule is that it ensures that countries are limited in their ability to violate their MFN obligations 
by selectively picking and choosing sectors (Finger 1993). Absent this requirement WTO Members 
would have an incentive to provide preferred partners with tariff cuts in areas where maximum trade 
diversion could result, and thus undo the cornerstone of the GATT, non-discriminatory trade 
liberalization (Grossman and Helpman, 1995).  
Article V GATS imposes three conditions on economic integration agreements in the area of 
services. First, they must have substantial sectoral coverage, in terms of the number of sectors, volume 
of trade affected, and modes of supply. Services PTAs may not provide for the a priori exclusion of 
any mode of supply. Second, services PTAs must provide for the absence or elimination of 
substantially all measures violating national treatment in sectors where specific commitments were 
made in the GATS at the entry into force of the agreement or within a reasonable time frame. Third, 
PTAs may not result in higher trade barriers against third countries. The substantial sectoral coverage 
requirement is arguably weaker than the ‘substantially all trade’ criterion of Article XXIV.14 The same 
is true regarding the criteria for the magnitude of liberalization required and the external policy stance 
of the PTA, as the benchmark is not free trade in services among PTA members, but only going 
beyond the specific commitments made under the GATS by the PTA members. 
The determination of whether PTAs satisfy Art. XXIV and/or Art. V is the responsibility of the 
WTO Council. In the pre-WTO period, a working party was formed to establish if a notified PTA 
conformed to GATT rules. Under the WTO, a standing Committee on Regional Trade Agreements 
(CRTA) was created that has taken over this task. As is well known, the process of testing PTAs 
against Article XXIV has been very ineffective. Only one PTA has ever been deemed to conform to 
the WTO rules.
15
 The shift to a CRTA did not lead to more effective review of the compliance of 
PTAs with WTO requirements. In fact, the opposite is the case: we have moved to a world without any 
review of legal consistency. Following the advent of the Transparency Mechanism in 2006, WTO 
Members no longer vote on the legal consistency of notified PTAs. Instead, if they believe they are 
inconsistent, they can challenge them before a WTO Panel, a practice that seldom if ever occurs.  
In recent years the coverage of the average PTA has tended to increase substantially. PTAs have 
gone from agreements that dealt almost exclusively with tariffs and related restrictive regulations of 
commerce (such as rules of origin) to becoming contractual arrangements that cover a wide range of 
regulatory policies. Horn et al. (2010) review the subject-matter signed by the two main hubs 
(European Union and the United States) between 1992 and 2008 and identify over 50 areas subject to 
provisions in one or more PTAs, ranging from anti-corruption policies and macro-economic 
cooperation to environmental protection and antitrust policies.
16
 The situation is similar for PTAs 
covering trade and investment in services. Many of the more recent vintage PTAs cover substantially 
more services and services policies than does the GATS (Roy, Marchetti and Lim, 2007; Marchetti 
and Roy, 2009; Miroudot, Sauvage and Sudreau, 2010).  
It follows that there is a discrepancy between the subject-matter of PTAs and that of the WTO. This 
is widening steadily and has many implications. Of particular interest to the subject of this paper is 
that a less than multilateral legislative framework is developing in areas that escape totally or partially 
the current multilateral regime. The WTO has nothing to say on many of the new issues that are 
covered by PTA disciplines and provisions. Indeed, WTO Members may not even be aware of 
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 We say ‘arguably’ since this term has never been interpreted by the CRTA or by dispute adjudication Panels. 
15
 The customs union between the Czech and Slovak Republics. This is not surprising given that the two countries were a 
federation prior to their ‘velvet divorce’ in January 1993. (As both countries are now EU members, this customs union no 
longer applies.) 
16
 Compare also Heydon and Woolcock (2009).  
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developments in PTAs, although the new Transparency Mechanism enhances the access to 
information that WTO Members have in this regard. 
Plurilateral Agreements: As already noted, the WTO does not prejudge the content of PAs. In 
principle, therefore, a PA may deal with a matter that is already covered by the WTO – e.g., a PA on 
trade in services – as well as subjects that the WTO does not address – e.g., investment or competition 
policies. Thus, a PA may have broad or very narrow coverage. The beef and dairy agreements were 
examples of narrow, product-specific arrangements; the GPA is an example of a PA that addresses a 
policy area that has wider coverage (purchases of goods and services by governments, a market that 
can represent 5 to 10 percent of GDP).  
Although the WTO legal texts are unclear in this respect, we believe that a bright line should divide 
PTAs from PAs. In principle, nothing in the legal statutes prohibits WTO Members from negotiating a 
PA that would consist of tariff reductions in one tariff line.
17
 But could such types of agreements be 
accepted as being in the spirit of the overall economy of the Agreement? Recall that the reason why 
there is a requirement for liberalizing ‘substantially all trade’ (or, negotiating PTAs with substantial 
trade coverage in GATS) is precisely because the Membership did not want to see MFN deviations for 
just one tariff line. Clearly we should not introduce through the window what we wanted to avoid 
coming in through the back door. Also, recall that PTAs (in the goods area at least) were conceived of 
as mechanisms aiming to liberalize policy instruments that could be used to protect domestic 
producers, essentially tariffs. It is more difficult for WTO Members to protect their domestic market 
through national regulatory instruments, e.g. France cannot adopt one environmental policy vis-à-vis 
Germany and a different one vis-à-vis the rest of the world. One would therefore expect that PAs focus 
on disciplining domestic instruments (non-tariff measures), as has been the case in the GPA, to date 
the only meaningful PA. The story is somewhat different with respect to trade in services, insofar as 
domestic instruments can be used to protect the domestic market (this is because national treatment is 
a specific commitment in GATS, and not a general obligation as it is in the GATT). 
While Art. X.9 of the WTO Agreement allows for WTO Members to agree to add new PAs (by 
consensus), this provision leaves open the question whether the consensus concerns a negotiated 
document or acceptance by the membership of a subset of Members seeking to negotiate a PA on a 
given subject. A careful reading of Art. X.9 suggests that approval or rejection will be on the basis of 
the text that the interested countries (participating in the PA) have negotiated. There is a difference in 
this regard between the treatment of existing PAs and new ones. Of the four PAs that were included in 
Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement only one was subsequently modified: the GPA. . The new GPA
18
 has 
yet to enter into force: it will do so only thirty days after two-thirds of its signatories have deposited 
their instrument of ratification, which is expected to occur by the end of 2013. The final text was not 
approved by the WTO Membership. In the case of a new PA, the Membership would not be asked to 
approve the launch of negotiations.  
Given the consensus rule, any WTO Member can say no when the final text of a proposed PA is 
presented to them. Less clear is whether WTO Members that are non-participants in a proposed PA 
can suggest changes or impose conditions for the acceptance of the PA. In principle there is nothing to 
preclude this, although in practice it is unlikely that parties to the proposed agreement would be 
willing to make changes unless these had the support of a significant number of WTO Members. 
Whether or not any such suggestions are made, a basic difference with PTAs is that the WTO 
Membership can vote down an initiative to negotiate a PA whereas in the case of PTAs parties are free 
to do what they like (risking only a challenge before a Panel, which as mentioned above is a very low 
                                                     
17
 Subject of course to the PA being accepted by the WTO membership as a new Annex 4 agreement. 
18
 WTO Doc. GPA/W/297 of December 11, 2006.  
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probability event).
19
 The fact that there are no provisions or criteria on what is (should be) permitted in 
terms of sectors or their content/coverage implies that there is great flexibility in principle for those 
aspiring to establish a PA, but that utilization of this flexibility is constrained by the need to obtain 
approval by all WTO Members, even if many or most do not intend to join. 
2.2 Membership and Accession 
PTAs: Two questions are of interest here: (i) who can accede to a PTA?; and (ii) under what 
conditions will accession take place?  
One would think that Art. XXIV GATT (like Art. V GATS) is a discipline to be observed by WTO 
Members only. Art. XXIV.5 reads: 
Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories of 
contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of an 
interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area; 
(emphasis added). 
In this vein, to the extent that a WTO Member grants an advantage to a non-WTO Member by signing 
a PTA, it would have to, by virtue of Art. I GATT, automatically and unconditionally extend it to all 
WTO Members. Yet, practice has developed in a different way.
20
 WTO Members, irrespective 
whether they enjoy developed- or developing country status, notify the CRTA and/or the Committee 
on Trade and Development (CTD) of their PTAs, including those involving non-WTO Members.
21
  
The relevant statutes do not provide for a minimum number of signatories that must exist for a PTA 
to be formed. Thus, two countries suffice, and in practice many PTAs have two signatories only. The 
WTO statutes are also silent regarding the conditions of subsequent accessions to a PTA. There is no 
right to accede to a PTA even if aspiring members are willing to match (or exceed) the liberalization 
effort of the incumbents: accession depends solely on the incumbents. As a result, PTAs are, in 
principle, closed clubs. The absence of ‘open regionalism’ is a quintessential dimension of PTAs that 
makes them stumbling blocks for multilateralism in the eyes of some analysts.
22
  
Plurilateral Agreements: The relevant WTO statutes do not provide for a minimum number of 
WTO Members that must agree to participate for a PA to be launched. The term ‘plurilateral’ would 
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 Indeed, as we will develop in more detail below, approval of a PA implies that it becomes impossible to raise legal 
challenges against it, whereas the de facto non-approval of PTAs as a result of the advent of the Transparency 
Mechanism in 2006 means that PTA participants always run the risk of confronting a challenge before a WTO Panel. 
This raises the possibility that PA participants might be willing to pay a price in the sense of accepting to ‘water down’ 
their PA following objections by non-participants when the PA is presented for approval at the WTO. There is no 
practice on this score so far.  
20
 Practice has arguably evolved in a way that violates the letter of WTO law as WTO Members that sign PTAs with non-
WTO Members do not have to automatically and unconditionally extend benefits to all other WTO Members (assuming 
of course that they satisfy the statutory conditions for establishing a PTA). 
21
 If one of the members of the PTA is a developed country, the PTA will be notified to CRTA, whereas if they are both 
developing countries, it will go to CTD. EC–CARIFORUM is an example of the former (Bahamas is part of the 
agreement, but not a WTO Member), and Ukraine-Uzbekistan is an example of the latter. MERCOSUR involves 
developing countries only and yet, probably because of the size of the Brazilian market it had to be notified to both 
committees. 
22
 Bhagwati (2008); Bhagwati and Panagariya (1999). Deardorff (1994) and Saggi, Yildiz, and Missios (2012) argue that 
the type of PTA matters in this regard. FTAs, the most frequently observed type of PTA, may induce and certainly allow 
further trade liberalization with non-members, while the incentives to do so in the case of customs unions is likely to be 
weaker. These incentive effects matter because the WTO does not impose requirements regarding accession. Many PTAs 
are effectively closed shops in that they do not have accession provisions, or, if they do, membership is limited to 
countries from a given geographic area—e.g., the EU or the TPP. 
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indicate more than two WTO Members, but how many more Members are needed to suffice for an 
agreement to be called plurilateral is up to the Membership to determine. The same is true for 
accession—there are no general provisions in the WTO defining criteria for accession to a PA. The 
terms for accession to the Annex 4 Agreements included at the end of the Uruguay Round are spelled 
out in each PA separately (Art. XII.3 WTO). For example, Art. XXIV.2 of the Agreement on 
Government Procurement reads:  
Any government which is a Member of the WTO, or prior to the date of entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement which is a contracting party to GATT 1947, and which is not a Party to this 
Agreement may accede to this Agreement on terms to be agreed between that government and the 
Parties. Accession shall take place by deposit with the Director-General of the WTO of an 
instrument of accession which states the terms so agreed. The Agreement shall enter into force for 
an acceding government on the 30th day following the date of its accession to the Agreement. 
(emphasis added). 
Consequently, the terms of accession to a plurilateral agreement are determined by the contractual 
arrangement between incumbents and the new kid on the block. There are no ex ante general 
conditions that if met, would automatically lead to accession; those aspiring to join a PA cannot do so 
until they have satisfied all requests of the incumbents. Accession, in other words, is a matter of 
negotiation between the ‘ins’ and the ‘outs’. That said, the language on accession in the GPA makes 
clear that any WTO Member can join. This is quite different from the situation prevailing for PTAs.
23
 
Practice does not shed any additional light on this. Armenia and Chinese Taipei acceded to the 
GPA in 2011 and 2009, respectively, but it is difficult to compare the terms and conditions under 
which they joined with those of the incumbents. The key point here is that accession to plurilaterals 
will not occur when pre-defined, non-discriminatory terms and conditions have been met by aspiring 
members, but upon satisfaction of conditions unilaterally imposed by incumbents. They may seek to 
impose a heavier price than what they paid in order to extend admittance to the club so that WTO 
Members seeking to join a PA might find the door closed.  
2.3 Transparency 
PTAs: Both the GATT and GATS contain provisions relating to transparency and multilateral 
surveillance of PTAs. Countries intending to form, join or modify a PTA must notify this to the WTO 
and make available relevant information requested by WTO Members. Although CRTA efforts to 
determine the consistency of the agreement with multilateral rules are not effective – indeed as already 
mentioned, as of 2006 there is no more discussion on the legal consistency of a notified PTA with the 
multilateral rules – the process does generate information as a result of the obligation on members to 
inform the WTO Secretariat on newly launched negotiations as well as newly signed PTAs. Notified 
PTAs are considered on the basis of a factual presentation by the WTO Secretariat, to be concluded 
within one year of notification. WTO Members may ask questions or make comments concerning 
factual presentations of PTAs. The implementation of the liberalization commitments under the PTA 
should be notified to the WTO Secretariat. 
The transparency mechanism for PTAs may help move the balance of assessments of PTAs back 
towards what was intended by the drafters of the GATT – ex ante review and engagement by the 
collective Membership on the design of a PTA, as opposed to what gradually emerged over time: 
ineffectual ex post assessments. However, the track record to date suggests that multilateral scrutiny is 
not an effective source of discipline on PTAs. The transparency mechanism does not have any teeth, 
and it was clear from the deliberations that preceded the creation of the mechanism that many WTO 
Members do not intend to use it as a means of exerting greater pressure on countries to abide by the 
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rules. The fact that the process involves a “consideration” of a PTA as opposed to an “examination” is 
revealing in this regard.  
Plurilateral Agreements: There is no analogue to the CRTA for PAs. Transparency is ensured 
through the process of notification to the General Council and the need for the Council to approve any 
PA that is brought forward. As decisions to accept a PA are taken on the basis of consensus, all WTO 
Members have the opportunity to scrutinize the terms of a PA. This ex ante approval mechanism 
differentiates PAs from PTAs—which, as already mentioned, effectively are not subject to ex ante 
approval. Moreover, if approved, a PA will be associated with the establishment of the types of WTO 
bodies that assist Members in the implementation of agreements, such as a Committee, with regular 
(annual) reporting on activities to the Council, and documentation that is open to all WTO Members. 
As noted above, the approval process has important legal repercussions: whereas challenges against 
PTAs are possible, challenges against approved PAs are legally impossible. 
2.4 Dispute Adjudication 
PTAs: Disputes between partners in a PTA that are also WTO Members can, in principle, be solved in 
either the PTA-forum or before the WTO if the matter is subject to WTO disciplines. It is possible that 
the same dispute is raised both in the PTA forum and before the WTO. In one WTO dispute so far, 
Argentina—Poultry Antidumping Duties, Argentina argued that Brazil was precluded from submitting 
the dispute to a WTO Panel since the very same dispute had already been adjudicated by a 
MERCOSUR Panel. The WTO Panel dismissed Argentina’s argument because, inter alia, in its view 
Art. 3.2 DSU did not require Panels to rule in any particular way and thus need not conform to 
decisions by other adjudicating fora.  
Some PTAs require disputes to be addressed through PTA-specific mechanisms. Thus, the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provides that for certain kinds of disputes (for instance, 
environmental disputes) that in principle could be subject to both NAFTA and WTO proceedings, the 
complainant is required to use NAFTA facilities exclusively. Submitting a dispute to the PTA forum 
will deprive the WTO judge from ‘completing’ the original contract through case law interpretation, 
and eviscerates the relevance of the WTO dispute settlement system in a more general manner. 
Koremenos (2007) shows that only half of all existing PTAs contain dispute settlement rules. While 
many are quite inactive in settling disputes, in the future countries may find it more useful/appropriate 
to submit disputes to a PTA forum. As the coverage of PTAs extends further beyond the WTO, this 
becomes more likely, as the DSU will not be applicable. There is, therefore, a strong likelihood of 
fragmentation in case law and interpretation of provisions, as well as less transparency then would 
arise if all disputes were addressed through a common dispute settlement mechanism. 
Plurilateral agreements: A similar risk does not arise with PAs. Disputes under the GPA must be 
submitted to WTO Panels (and eventually the Appellate Body). This is beneficial for the development 
of the legal regime of the world trading system as judges can ensure consistency with other WTO case 
law in interpreting the meaning of the agreed contractual arrangement. It is a guarantee that case law 
regarding plurilaterals will develop harmoniously with case law regarding the multilateral WTO 
agreements. This aspect of adjudication is beneficial to the world trading system since the same 
concepts will often be used in plurilateral and multilateral agreements. Assigning the competence to 
adjudicate disputes coming under the purview of a PA to bodies other than WTO Panels would result 
in less legal certainty and diverging case law.  
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3. Discussion  
3.1 Commonalities and Discrepancies between PTAs and PAs 
The discussion of the legal regime above reveals that there are similarities but also differences 
between PTAs and PAs from a systemic perspective. One important commonality is that both can be 
non-MFN. Both PTAs and PAs will only be negotiated if there are concerns about free-riding and it is 
feasible (legal) to exclude non-parties. If this is not possible a critical mass approach will need to be 
pursued, with the outcome applied on an MFN basis (such as the ITA or sector-specific tariff 
elimination agreements). PTAs and PAs are likely to involve discrimination and can give rise to trade 
diversion.
24
  
Another common element is that both instruments involve binding commitments that are 
enforceable. Neither Art. XXIV GATT (or Art. V GATS), nor the various provisions regulating PAs 
discuss this point explicitly, and yet unless we understand these provisions as legally enforceable they 
become senseless: why bother reviewing a PA or PTA that contains only best-endeavours provisions?  
Yet another commonality is that neither is a very effective instrument to address the major market 
access issues that have been a key source of the deadlock in the Doha round—i.e., the fact that at the 
end of the day large trading powers want more liberalization in the areas of agricultural trade policies 
and non-agricultural market access (NAMA) to allow them to take a proposed deal to their 
legislatures. A situation where large players all want to see more on the “market access table” can only 
very partially be addressed by shifting the focus to PTAs or to PAs – what is needed is to agree on a 
negotiating set that has enough to interest the major powers.  
PAs differ from PTAs in many respects and it is important to recognize that the two mechanisms 
are by no means perfect substitutes. PTAs will often have as a major objective the integration of the 
markets of the participating countries on an explicitly discriminatory basis—something that is 
recognized and accepted by all WTO Members. This is not something that PAs are an appropriate 
vehicle for, even if the potential for subsequent accessions is explicitly acknowledged.
25
 PAs ensure 
greater transparency, a much closer ‘connection’ with day-to-day WTO activities and processes, and 
greater coherence when it comes to case law/dispute settlement. An implication is that PAs will 
impose more of a burden on the WTO Secretariat than PTAs—i.e., they are associated with 
administrative costs for the WTO. This may be one reason why, in contrast to PTAs, PAs must be 
approved by the WTO Membership, whereas the only source of potential discipline on PTAs is the 
DSU. However, as this has not been used to date, in practice multilateral disciplines on PTAs are 
much weaker than those on PAs.  
PAs also differ from PTAs in that the former have been, and most likely will be, (much) narrower 
in scope. A PTA will usually cover many policy areas, ranging from trade in goods and services to 
investment, IPRs and development assistance and other forms of (often ‘soft law’) cooperation. Recall 
that, unless substantially all trade is covered, PTA-partners might see their agreement challenged 
before a WTO Panel. The condition imposed on WTO Members that PTAs cover substantially all 
trade (have substantial sectoral coverage in the case of services) is intended to ensure that a PTA is not 
used as a mechanism to engage in selective discrimination for just a few products or a specific sector. 
Although there have been only a few cases contesting the consistency of a PTA with the multilateral 
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 As has long been noted in the literature on PTAs, diversion effects often will be a political precondition (driver) for a 
PTA. See Hirschman (1981) for the basic insight, and Grossman and Helpman (1995) for a formal analysis. 
25
 As noted previously each PA defines the applicable accession modalities and procedures; there is no explicit requirement 
in the WTO that states that that PAs be open to any WTO member. Art. XII.3 WTO simply states that “Accession to a 
Plurilateral Trade Agreement shall be governed by the provisions of that Agreement.”  
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rules, one reason for this is that in practice WTO Members have designed PTAs to have broad sectoral 
coverage.  
In contrast to a PTA, a PA may deal with just one issue. If approved by the Membership, it is not 
open to challenge under the DSU as a PTA may be. Of course the chosen issue may have many 
dimensions and cover many types of activities, as is the case with procurement, but it need not. The 
agreements on dairy and bovine meat are examples of very narrow product-specific agreements, while 
the PA on civil aircraft deals with a specific sector. A sector-specific PA is an example of a deal that 
the rules written down in Arts. XXIV GATT and Art. V GATS were designed to preclude. Clearly a 
PA that is designed to extend narrowly defined market access concessions only to those WTO 
Members who reciprocate will imply a blatant undercutting of the MFN rule, and a shift to a world 
where small countries without large markets and the ability to affect their terms of trade could end up 
being excluded from the benefits of (reciprocal) market opening by a group of countries. Such PAs 
therefore can be expected to be rejected by those who are excluded from (or simply decided not to 
participate in) the PA. Moreover, if the potential club members go ahead and conclude such a PA 
outside the WTO that undercuts existing WTO commitments they can – and presumably will – be 
taken to court in the WTO for violation of the MFN rule.  
PAs may deal with issues that are already subject to WTO disciplines or which cover matters that 
are not covered by the WTO. It would appear that fewer concerns are raised by PAs dealing with new 
issues than subjects that are already covered by the WTO. The GPA stayed a PA after the Uruguay 
Round because procurement is explicitly excluded from the reach of Art. III GATT (national 
treatment) and the GATS (Art. XIII.1)—although in contrast to the GATT, the GATS calls for 
negotiations on procurement of services to be launched 2 years after the entry into force of the 
agreement (i.e., 1997).
26
 The GPA precedent suggests that one rationale or function of PAs could be as 
an instrument to allow WTO Members to deal with issues that are not (yet) covered by the WTO—any 
disciplines that are agreed among a subset of countries will not undercut existing commitments as 
there are none. This is not the case for PAs dealing with subjects that are already covered by the WTO. 
An example is the recent suggestion by some countries to negotiate PAs on services or on trade 
facilitation. In such instances a PA may undercut the MFN rule insofar as signatories apply 
commitments on a discriminatory basis. While this is detrimental to non-signatories, the alternative to 
a PA may be a PTA. In the case of services a PTA is a feasible option; in the case of other topics such 
as trade facilitation it is not. However, even if a PTA is not a feasible alternative, countries can pursue 
cooperation outside the WTO. In assessing the implications of a potential or proposed PA it is 
therefore necessary to consider whether PTAs are an alternative. If so, any discrimination that is 
associated with the PA will also arise with the PTA. But a PA will have benefits that the PTA does 
not—including greater transparency and the prospect of eventual accession if countries decide to join 
at a future date.  
The fact that PAs can be adopted as an Annex 4 agreement exclusively by consensus (after they 
have been negotiated, i.e., once their content has been established) and that participation is voluntary 
(whatever disciplines are negotiated only apply to signatories) would appear to offer substantial 
assurance to WTO Members that they have little to fear from efforts by some countries to negotiate 
PAs. Why are they such a sensitive issue then? A number of arguments have been put forward by 
analysts and governments why the PA approach should be opposed. We revert to this discussion in 
what immediately follows.  
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 Such talks have been taking place in the Working Party on GATS Rules since 1995 but no progress has been made on the 
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3.2 Arguments against PAs 
A major advantage of continued efforts to agree to multilateral disciplines that apply in principle to all 
Members—even if ‘special and differential treatment’ provisions imply that some countries will be 
exempted from implementation for some time—is that all countries have a say in what the applicable 
rules should be for a given issue.
27
 An objection to PAs that has been made by India in WTO 
discussions and echoed by Sutherland et al. (2004) is that this could open the door to agreements 
among subsets of countries on controversial issues such as labor or environmental standards. Greater 
use of PAs will result in a multi-tier system with differentiated commitments and thus some erosion of 
the MFN principle – as club members would have the right to restrict benefits to other members. If 
PAs address areas not covered by the current WTO mandate, erosion of MFN is not an issue, although 
there will be a “precedent-setting effect”. If PAs deal with matters covered by the WTO and entail 
preferential improvements in market access commitments, then the MFN principle will unavoidably 
be eroded. MFN will become conditional, i.e., only those making the commitments will profit from it. 
However, existing WTO disciplines provide assurances that efforts to incorporate new PAs on 
controversial issues or that result in erosion of MFN can be blocked. Thus, if a PA were to involve 
signatories preferentially lowering tariffs, or removing market access restrictions in services sectors 
where commitments have been made under the GATS, or providing preferential treatment in other 
areas that are subject to WTO rules – e.g., exempting a country from the application of antidumping 
duties – and so forth, the PA can always be rejected by the WTO Membership: the high threshold for 
approval of any new PA guarantees that WTO Members have the ability to block PAs that are deemed 
to be against the interests of non-signatories. 
Second, PAs will define the rules of the game in a specific area. Wolfe (2007) notes that any PA 
will invariably include Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member 
countries that may already have achieved much of whatever level of cooperation-cum-discipline that is 
agreed for an issue, and that many non-OECD countries are not going to have the capacity to 
participate in negotiations that will set a precedent. PAs are likely to reflect the interests and current 
practices of the initial signatories, which may not be appropriate for all countries. Capacity constraints 
and resulting non-participation by developing countries in a negotiation makes it less likely that an 
agreement will address issues that are of primary concern to low-income economies. Clubs will define 
the rules of the game in an area that will be difficult to change subsequently if and when initial non-
signatories decide to participate. Experience illustrates that it is very difficult to amend (re-negotiate) 
disciplines, so that a plurilateral approach may well become analogous to the Acquis Communautaire 
for prospective members of the EU—i.e., non-negotiable.  
Thus, even if countries opt out, there may be a first mover’s advantage that should not be under-
estimated—in practice the advantage may be in favor of OECD countries and major emerging markets 
that have the capacity to engage effectively on the substance of proposed rules.
28
 While this may be 
true, the presumption that PAs will be dominated by large OECD countries such as the US may not 
necessarily be correct. PAs also offer a mechanism that a broad set of WTO Members could use to 
move forward in an area where one of the large WTO members is not willing or able to participate. A 
PA that centers on operationalizing 100% duty-free, quota free access for LDCs is a potential 
example—something that is currently not feasible for the US to agree, but that has already been 
implemented by many other countries and where greater cooperation on issues like rules of origin 
among these countries could enhance the benefits for LDCs.  
Third, a PA approach may result in a long-term bifurcation in the WTO Membership, splitting 
‘insiders’ from ‘outsiders’. This was the pattern that emerged in the GATT years, with very few 
countries subsequently joining the Tokyo Round codes after their initial negotiation. If so, the 
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plurilateral approach would move the WTO towards a two-track regime with subsets of countries 
(clubs) playing in their own sandbox. Many developing countries have argued that this is contrary to 
the basic character of the WTO and conflicts with the consensus-based approach that has historically 
been the norm (Bangladesh and others, 2003). In practice, much will depend on the substantive 
content of a PA and the intent of those countries that agree to negotiate a PA. Given the great 
heterogeneity in levels of development, social preferences, endowments, and so forth that prevails in 
the WTO, it is inevitable that a PA might address issues that are not seen to be priorities for some 
(many) WTO Members.  
This is arguably a good reason to have the PA option in the first place, as it allows countries to 
cooperate on a given policy area. But there is also the possibility that a group of countries may seek to 
negotiate a PA with the strategic objective of excluding others. Reports suggest that in the case of the 
ISA talks some of the “real good friends” of services do not want to include countries that they deem 
to be opposed to pursuing further liberalization of services markets. If the club members end up 
agreeing to disciplines that are unacceptable to countries that are not part of the 
negotiations/agreement (e.g., by including provisions that greatly circumscribe the scope for state-
owned enterprises to operate in specific sectors) the question then is whether a PA would be worse 
from a global welfare/multilateral system perspective than if these countries concluded a PTA. A 
world in which there are many PTAs that deal differently with a specific subject area could well be 
worse for global welfare (efficiency) than one in which the issue is addressed through a PA.
29
 Of 
course, much depends here on the counterfactual—whether an issue is addressed in PTAs, and the 
weight that is accorded by the WTO Membership on maintaining a WTO that does not allow for 
additional distinctions across its Membership even if this generates less in the way of overall welfare 
gains (irrespective of their distribution).  
Fourth, PAs may have implications for (constraining) the use of alternative approaches to cooperate 
on an issue area. This would only apply to situations where the focus is on regulatory types of issues. 
One such alternative is “soft law” forms of cooperation—mechanisms that encourage learning through 
regular interactions of relevant policymakers and stakeholders and monitoring of the impacts of 
policies and their effectiveness in attaining stated objectives (Hoekman, 2005). A characteristic of PAs 
is that they are binding—they can be enforced through the DSU. This is an important reason why they 
are attractive to demandeurs. If a binding set of rules was not the objective, use could be made of 
alternative fora to provide an institutional framework for cooperation in a specific area—there is no 
need to go to the WTO. Depending on the issue a good case may exist for a non-binding approach to 
cooperation. However, it is unclear why a PA would preclude countries from pursuing such forms of 
cooperation.  
Fifth, PAs will impose additional costs on the rest of the WTO Membership by utilizing the WTO 
‘infrastructure’ – including operation of a Committee, making use of the WTO facilities, potential 
invocation of the DSU, calling on the Secretariat for support, etc. The fact that the operation of a PA is 
centered in the WTO as opposed to occurring outside it is a positive feature but this does come with 
additional direct costs, as well as potential opportunity costs given limited Secretariat resources. There 
is a straightforward solution to this problem: signatories can be required to provide additional 
contributions to the WTO in order to cover the cost of implementing and administering PAs. They 
would need to incur these costs in any event if the PTA route is chosen instead, assuming that is 
feasible, or through another form of cooperation if it is not (e.g., if the issue involves regulatory 
cooperation). This might be particularly important since PAs could extend to areas on which there is 
no embedded expertise in the WTO Secretariat. Assuming unwillingness to outsource the servicing of 
the PAs, the WTO will need to be provided with additional expertise in the areas covered.  
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Finally, moving down the PA track may imply that countries give up negotiating chips that could 
be used to obtain concessions in other areas in a multilateral negotiation. The fundamental premise 
underlying the Single Undertaking is that it permits issue linkage: country A can get something it 
wants by giving up something that country B wants and the trade may involve subjects that have 
nothing to do with each other. If PAs are negotiated for specific issues, the scope for such linkage may 
decline. Much depends here on the subject matter of a potential PA, contracting costs.
30
 If it does not 
offer much in the way of negotiating leverage for the countries that are involved – i.e., nobody is 
inclined to “pay” much if anything for a deal – the “linkage downside’ will be small. The absence of 
linkage potential might, under some circumstances, act as incentive to join the PA in the first place if it 
reduces the opportunity cost of participation. But there is no presumption that this will be the case. If 
so, countries concerned will have the option of not participating in the PA.  
4. Supporting Greater Use of Plurilateral Agreements  
Some of the foregoing concerns and arguments that have been raised regarding the potential effects of 
PAs on the multilateral trading system are compelling; others are not. For the reasons discussed above 
and in light of the heterogeneity of the WTO Membership we take the view that it would be beneficial 
to allow for more ‘variable geometry’ to be pursued under the umbrella of the WTO. This is preferable 
to a situation where countries are pushed into ever greater reliance on PTAs – which effectively escape 
multilateral disciplines – or are induced to engage in cooperation outside the WTO (as in the case of 
the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) negotiations).  
We should note at this point that even the EU, a regime with arguably substantially greater 
homogeneity, allows for the establishment of PAs across a sub-set of its membership, the most 
notorious being the EMU, the European Monetary Union. Besides the EMU, enhanced cooperation 
agreements (ECA) are possible for a sub-set of the EU Membership (Art 20 TEU). Although so far 
practice is scarce, many believe that in the future this could be an instrument that could propel further 
European integration (e.g., Baldwin, et al. 2001; Harstad, 2006). As Bordignon and Brusco (2006) 
observe, ‘heterogeneity among EU members has become so large that it is difficult to find common 
policies beneficial to all countries’. They show that when centralization is not politically feasible sub-
union formation could be optimal if it takes into account the utility of excluded countries. If this is true 
for the EU, it is it even more so for the WTO. There are some features of the EU ECA-regime that, if 
adopted in the WTO, would strengthen the case for PAs:
31
 
(a) Art. 20 TEU (Treaty of the European Union) makes clear that ECA should aim to “further the 
objectives of the Union, protect its interests and reinforce the integration process”; 
(b) Art. 326.1 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) underscores that ECAs shall 
not “constitute a barrier to or discrimination in trade between Member States, nor shall it distort 
competition between them”; 
(c) Art. 329 TFEU suggests that at least 9/27 EU Member States must propose an ECA; 
(d) Art. 328 TFEU explicitly states that ECAs should be open to all Member States that can 
demonstrate that they have met the requirements embedded in the authorizing (ECA) decision.
32
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Providing for a quorum, ensuring that PAs will be in line with the objectives of the WTO, and 
agreeing ex ante to submit to arbitration/dispute adjudication disagreements as to whether accession 
requirements have been met could usefully be implemented in the current WTO legislative framework. 
What is needed are clear ex ante rules on PAs that ensure that such agreements are not vehicles for 
some countries to escape their general or specific WTO obligations and that the interests of small/poor 
countries are protected. Lawrence (2006) discusses a number of criteria that would help ensure that 
what he calls the club-of-clubs option is facilitated while safeguarding the interests of those that are 
not interested in participating. He suggests that PAs be restricted to subjects that are clearly trade-
related; that any new PA be open to all WTO Members in the negotiation stage – i.e., participation in 
the development of rules should not be limited to likely signatories; and that PA members be required 
to use the DSU to settle disputes, with eventual retaliation being restricted to the area covered by the 
agreement (as is the case under the GPA).  
The DSU is presumably an important reason why countries would want to bring a PA to the WTO 
in the first place. The “open to all ex ante” norm may be problematical, however, in that it assumes 
that participation will be in good faith. But what happens if countries stonewall and seek to block 
progress on an issue by a majority of participants? WTO Members that have no intention to participate 
might behave “strategically” and try to raise the costs for those that are eager to establish new rules. 
Some countries engaged in the ISA talks have indicated that they are not seeking to pull in countries 
that showed very limited interest in making substantial liberalization commitments in the course of the 
Doha negotiations. This suggests an “open access” criterion for the initial negotiation phase of a PA 
should be tempered by recognition and acceptance that at some point a PA negotiation must be limited 
to those countries that are serious about making commitments on a specific matter. As noted, open 
access in the sense that once negotiated any PA allow for accession by any WTO Member is not 
explicitly required in Art. X.9. Instead, accession provisions are defined in the individual PAs. It 
would be desirable to agree explicitly that ‘open access’ defined in this way be a precondition for 
approval of any PA. Other criteria might be considered as well, e.g., prohibiting incumbents from 
ratcheting up the entry price for latecomers and making this enforceable through binding arbitration if 
contested. 
In practice not all countries will be able to engage on an equal footing in the negotiation of a PA. 
There are major differences in capacities to engage on regulatory matters and the ability to participate 
in a fully informed way. Some governments may find it difficult to determine the ‘return’ to applying 
a proposed rule (e.g., the direct administrative costs or the size – and perhaps even the sign – of the net 
economic impact of implementing a proposed set of disciplines). A lack of capacity and human 
resources is one reason why many countries were not keen to negotiate on the Singapore issues. 
Moving to a plurilateral approach in defining new rules for a subset of WTO Members will not 
alleviate capacity constraints. But capacity constraints are general—they apply as much to MFN 
negotiations as they do to PAs.
33
 Given the existence of capacity constraints, opportunity cost 
considerations become important as well. Countries will presumably allocate scarce resources to issue 
areas where they perceive the greatest potential for gains from cooperation.  
LDCs are likely to be among the least able to engage in PA talks that focus on regulatory issues or 
matters that are not covered by the WTO. Whatever the subject of a PA, consideration could be given 
to extending whatever is negotiated amongst a club of WTO Members to all LDCs on a non-reciprocal 
basis. This would help reduce the extent of any discrimination, be one way to give meaning to the 
LDC waiver, and ensure that PAs have a development dimension. Of course, the value of such action 
will depend on the capacity of the LDCs to benefit from (make use of) whatever is agreed among the 
PA members. In practice, even if a PA opens up market access opportunities for signatories, LDCs 
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 There are mechanisms that can be used to address the issue, including delegation to an “agent” that represents countries 
with limited capacity to engage in the negotiations. This can take the form of coalition formation and bundling of 
resources, or it could involve bringing in technical expertise. 
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may not have the capacity to benefit, especially if a precondition is satisfying specific minimum 
standards. This suggests that to be effective any PA should include an aid for trade component—
mechanisms to assist the LDCs improve their standards, regulation, etc. to the level that is required to 
benefit from the PA. Such mechanisms will need to be tailored to address whatever the associated 
capacity-building needs are. One possibility would be to develop PA-specific ‘platforms’ that help 
LDCs, as well as other developing countries with an interest in acceding to the PA, to undertake 
diagnostic analysis, identify action plans and implement needed reforms with funding and assistance 
from high-income PA signatories.
34
 Including an operational aid for trade dimension in PAs could 
enhance the relevance of PAs for LDCs and other low-income countries and give them a development 
dimension.
35
 
Another question is whether PAs should be permitted for any trade-related issue. One dimension of 
this is whether a distinction should be made between matters that are already subject to WTO 
disciplines (i.e., the PA would be WTO+) as opposed to matters that are not (yet) subject to 
multilateral rules (i.e., it is WTO-X). If an issue area is already subject to the WTO, any PA will by 
definition result in greater fragmentation of applicable rules, whether the focus of the PA is on 
disciplines for certain policies and/or involves signatories granting discriminatory access to each other. 
If the PA is WTO-X, it may be precedent-setting but there is no issue of fragmentation or undercutting 
MFN as this rule does not apply. Given that an agreement on a WTO-X subject will need to be 
accepted by the WTO Membership there is no compelling reason why there would need to be 
restrictions on the types of WTO-X issues that might be addressed in a PA, beyond that they are 
‘trade-related’.  
This is not the case for WTO+ PAs. Here a distinction can be made between WTO+ agreements 
that involve discriminatory market access concessions and PAs that involve regulatory commitments 
and cooperation. The former are more likely to be problematical from a trading system perspective for 
reasons discussed previously (they imply targeted, narrow discrimination of the type that the rules on 
PTAs were intended to prevent). The latter may also be discriminatory but any discrimination is more 
likely to be a side effect of whatever is jointly implemented—e.g., harmonization of regulatory 
standards and practices. In such situations there may be little scope for free riding by other countries. 
An example would be a PA on trade facilitation that involves signatories committing to specific 
actions (such as risk assessment practices, collection and sharing of data on consignments) that 
ensures reciprocal “green channel” treatment for goods. This implies better market access conditions 
for signatories, but this is conditional on a having put in place an agreed set of procedures, having 
made the necessary policy reforms and investments, etc.  
In sum, we would argue that if a PA involves regulatory cooperation/convergence for a policy area 
that is covered by the WTO (i.e., is WTO+) or addresses a WTO-X issue, it is unlikely to have 
detrimental consequences for the trading system. However, if the PA involves discriminatory market 
access in an area that is covered by the WTO, it will matter whether the PA is a narrow/product-
specific agreement or is broad-based. The former is likely to violate MFN and thus is likely to be 
precluded on that basis. The latter will also violate MFN. However, a broad-based agreement might 
also be pursued through a PTA. If this is a credible alternative to a PA, WTO Members need to 
consider the benefits that will come with a PA approach relative to a PTA—including greater 
transparency, potential for accession and gradual multilateralization,
36
 common dispute settlement, etc. 
The clearest example of such a trade-off is the current discussion on an ISA. If signatories of an ISA 
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 See Hoekman and Mattoo (2013) for suggestions along these lines in the area of services trade and investment. 
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 Given that PTAs may be used by countries as a substitute for non-reciprocal GSP type programs, PAs could also 
be conceived to be designed to advance specific development goals. For example, a PA might aim to promote 
technical expertise at the micro-level in dealing with conformity assessment; customs cooperation; etc. 
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 One potential advantage of a PA is that the design of market access and national treatment commitments in the agreement 
is more likely to be consistent with (i.e., allow) “docking” with the GATS at a later time.  
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make specific commitments in areas that they have excluded from the reach of the GATS there may be 
no violation of MFN.
37
  
A constraint in pursuing the plurilateral route is that the incorporation of a PA into the WTO 
requires unanimity (“exclusively by consensus”). Greater use of PAs arguably will require a relaxation 
of this rule (Tijmes-Lhl, 2010). Some are of the view that no such change is needed and that non-
members should be comfortable with the terms of any PA that is tabled (Lawrence, 2006). Recent 
discussions on a possible ISA or a PA on trade facilitation suggest that consensus is likely to be a 
binding constraint on greater use of PAs. With the exception of product/sector-specific agreements 
that grant PA members discriminatory access to each other’s markets, it is not clear that using the 
blocking option is in the interest of countries that do not have any intention of becoming a signatory to 
a proposed PA. This is because the counterfactual is not a critical mass MFN deal, the Single 
Undertaking with associated issue linkages, or continued deadlock – i.e., no action. More likely is that 
those prevented from moving forward in a PA will pursue more PTAs/deeper PTAs (if feasible), or 
issue-specific agreements outside the WTO that address regulatory policies that are not covered by 
existing WTO disciplines.
38
 In both scenarios the WTO increasingly will become a set of ‘minimum 
standards’ – a global trade institution that establishes only certain baseline conditions. 
Maintaining the strong consensus rule is arguably a recipe for inefficient outcomes. While 
presumably intended to ensure that any PA is consistent with multilateralism, it is arguably too strong 
a constraint. A rationale for the consensus rule may have been concern about countries putting forward 
subject areas simply because of the DSU or for ‘strategic’ reasons – e.g., controversial issues like 
labor standards. However, consensus is not needed to provide assurances that efforts to introduce PAs 
on controversial matters that are only weakly trade related can be blocked. Relaxing the consensus 
requirement – for example through agreement that “substantial coverage” of world trade or production 
is sufficient (Hufbauer and Schott, 2012)
39
 or acceptance that a two-thirds majority suffices – would 
still ensure that controversial issues can be rejected while removing the ability of a limited number of 
countries to block a PA that the majority of the WTO Membership finds acceptable. Recall that the 
Enhanced Cooperation Agreements that are foreseen in the EU context only require participation by 9 
out of 27 member states in instances where consensus cannot be obtained on an issue.  
5. Conclusion 
The apparent inability of WTO Members “to get to yes” in the Doha Round have led to numerous calls 
to revisit the Single Undertaking practice and consensus-based decision-making. It is not clear that 
suggestions to move away from these norms would be effective in addressing the reasons for the Doha 
deadlock. The lack of progress in the Doha Round reflects the assessment of major players that what 
has emerged on the table is not of sufficient interest to them—it is not that a small group of small 
countries are holding up a deal. Trade agreements are self-enforcing treaties: if the large players do not 
see it in their interest to deal, no amount of fiddling with alternative institutional arrangements will 
make a difference. Thus the role that PAs could play in moving forward subjects that have deadlocked 
the DDA is inherently limited. However, enabling even limited progress on specific policy areas and 
rule making should be welcomed.  
PAs offer a mechanism for subsets of WTO Members to move forward on issues of common 
concern, especially those that involve rule-making in areas that do not have a major market access 
dimension. An example is trade facilitation and logistics, where common standards and rules of the 
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 Of course the issue becomes moot insofar as specific commitments are applied on a MFN basis 
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 Or for that matter that build on WTO disciplines. The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement is an example. 
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 They suggest a minimum coverage of 40 percent of world trade as opposed to the norm of 90 percent that empirically has 
defined the feasibility of critical mass agreements in the GATT/WTO. 
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game that would lower trade costs would benefit all countries that agreed to move forward, while not 
being very valuable from an issue linkage perspective—as most of the gains (and currently costs of 
non-action) accrue to the countries that would join the agreement. Absent the PA option, WTO 
Members may be induced to pursue PTAs more intensively, which will be less inclusive (open) than 
PAs, or to engage in cooperation outside the WTO (if the issue is a WTO-X subject), in the process 
replicating some of the WTO machinery (e.g., transparency related; dispute settlement).  
For countries to have an incentive to negotiate a PA there need to be policy spillovers—otherwise 
there is no need for a binding deal that can be enforced through the DSU. The same is true of PTAs—
to be meaningful any PTA needs to involve binding commitments that can be enforced. An 
implication is that PAs and PTAs both will involve discrimination. If they did not, the countries 
involved could (and presumably would) apply whatever they negotiate on a MFN basis (i.e., pursue a 
critical mass approach). It may well be that regulatory commitments that are implemented by PA 
members will also benefit non-members, but the focus of PA signatories – as is the case for those that 
conclude PTAs – presumably will be on internalizing spillovers that their policies (or lack of policies) 
create for each other. Any PA will define rules of the game in a given policy area, with the associated 
benefits (and implementation costs) accruing primarily to signatories. 
The need for explicit approval of a PA for it to be incorporated as an Annex 4 agreement provides a 
strong assurance that PAs that are considered to be detrimental to the interests on non-members can be 
rejected. In our view ensuring that this assurance exists does not require consensus. It would still be 
guaranteed if the WTO Membership moved towards a weaker majority rule for acceptance of new 
PAs. Any PA will define the rules for non-members down the road when and if they want to join, but 
the precedent setting effects of the initial negotiation should not be overblown. Large countries will be 
able to negotiate terms—if incumbents do not demonstrate any flexibility in this regard the end result 
will be that the benefits of the PA for signatories are reduced as outsiders will not have an interest in 
joining. Accession discussions can be a useful trigger for the incumbents to re-consider the utility of 
specific provisions if this is tabled by prospective new members.  
Adding an aid for trade dimension to PAs can help improve the relevance of PAs for LDCs and 
other low-income countries. As LDCs are less likely to participate in PA negotiations, granting them 
all the benefits of what is agreed in the PA on a nonreciprocal basis would help to make PAs more 
inclusive. Whether a PA has a broad market access focus or is centred on rules regarding policies in a 
given area, it is likely that LDCs will need to improve their standards of regulation and bolster relevant 
implementing institutions. Dedicated mechanisms created as part of new PAs that provide assistance 
to LDCs and other low-income countries in establishing the preconditions for benefitting from – or 
participating in the PA – would ensure that PAs have a development dimension and are not limited to 
simply satisfying the needs and interests of the signatories.  
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Annex: Signatories of Tokyo Round codes (GATT Doc. L/5517/Add. 16 of May 3, 1985) 
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